What we, as a country, need to do to rescue the Thimphu Tech Park. Yes, it will take a full generation to get there. But that’s why we must start immediately, with a sense of urgency.
What we, as a country, need to do to rescue the Thimphu Tech Park. Yes, it will take a full generation to get there. But that’s why we must start immediately, with a sense of urgency.
The Ministry of Agriculture says that the prices of local vegetables is increasing. They are right. In fact, the prices of local vegetables have not just increased; they have skyrocketed.
Between this time last year and now, according to the Ministry of Agriculture, the price for local cabbages increased from Nu 37.43 to Nu 48.75. That’s an increase of 30.25%. The price of local chillies increased from Nu 270 to Nu 300 or by 11.11%. And the prices of potatoes and beans have jumped by a massive 47.22% and 39.40% respectively.
So what’s driving the prices of local vegetables? The Ministry of Agriculture has blamed inflation, the seasons and the rupee crisis.
Yes, inflation would have caused price increases. The last quarter recorded inflation at 13.53%. That’s the highest rate we’ve seen in years. But that’s nowhere near the 47% increase in the price of local potatoes. By comparison, the price of imported potatoes, which was Nu 17.83 per kg last year, increased only slightly, to Nu 20 per kg this year. We import most of what we consume from India. So inflation rates here follow those in India. And since the price of imported potatoes (and other vegetables) went up only marginally, inflation cannot be blamed for the huge increase in the cost of local potatoes (and local vegetables).
Nor can we blame the seasons. In their report, the government compared vegetables prices between two years but at the same season. So when they say that the price of local cabbages have increased from Nu 37.43 to Nu 48.75 per kg, they are talking about prices in June last year, versus prices in June this year. More significantly, the government has found out that production of local vegetables have gone up. All this means that we can’t pin the blame on the season.
The third excuse that the Ministry of Agriculture has offered for increasing vegetable prices is the rupee crisis. I agree, the rupee crisis is to blame. But not for the reasons that the Ministry of Agriculture thinks; not because the ngultrum is fetching fewer Indian rupees at the informal exchange market.
The rupee crisis did indeed cause a sudden hike in vegetable prices. But they went up due to an unlikely event. On 12 April the prime minister went on national TV to talk about the rupee crisis. During that talk, the prime minister announced that the government would no longer permit vegetables to be imported from India. Prices of local vegetables went up immediately. And haven’t come down since.
Walk into a shopping mall, and you’ll be greeted by customers sampling various perfumes.
Walk into the Norling Building in Changangkha, and you’ll also be greeted by customers sampling various perfumes. But there’s one big difference. The customers in the Norling Building, in Nado Poi shop to be exact, would be trying out different types of poi – traditional incense sticks for religious offerings.
That, at least, is what I saw the other day. I went to Nado’s to buy some poi, and bumped into a group of Taiwanese tourists. They, like children in a sweetshop, were excitedly trying out various types of incense – lighting the sticks, comparing fragrances, and identifying the best offerings to take back home.
Nado, an ex-monk from Tharpaling Monastery, started the incense factory more than two decades ago. The factory, Nado Poizokhang, has come a long way. They manufacture at least 13 types of poi, ranging in price from Nu 30 per packet to Nu 370 for a packet of their top-of-the-line Zurpoe.
Producing poi needs at least 30 different ingredients and one whole month of hard work involving no less than 12 full time employees. Most of the poi is consumed within the country. But a good amount ends up in homes and monasteries abroad.
The next time you are in the Changangkha area, I recommend that you try out the wonderful fragrances at Nado Poi Shop – you’ll add a whole new dimension to your shopping experience.
The National Assembly passed the Tax Revision Bill last week. The Bill is now with the National Council. The Council will discuss the Bill, but, because it is a “money bill”, the Council can only make suggestions and recommendations that the National Assembly may, or may not, chose to accept.
(Last year, the Assembly did not accept any of the Council’s recommendations on the budget and tax revision bills. In fact, the Assembly just skimmed through the recommendations, barely discussing them.)
The National Assembly has passed the Tax Revision Bill. But, we didn’t discuss it properly. After the Bill was introduced, the members made general comments. But the specifics of the Bill, including the individual taxes were not discussed, and just one item – Green Taxes on vehicles – was put to the vote.
I’m happy that the National Assembly didn’t approve most of the taxation measures. In fact, in my humble opinion, even the reduced green tax should not have been approved, given that the government failed to make a strong enough argument justifying the tax.
Still, we should have discussed the bill properly. The government should have justified each and every tax raise that they had proposed. And the Assembly should have debated the proposals thoroughly before deciding to approve or reject them.
Here are some of the issues I’d hoped to raise:
Justification to raise taxes. The Tax Revision Bill proposed introducing a Green Tax (for vehicles, fuels, lubricants, kerosene, LPG, refrigerators, freezers and air conditioners); raising the Excise Duty (on alcohol, domestic and imported); and raising the Sales Tax (on meat, fish and eggs, silk fabrics, furniture, and power chainsaws).
The government informed the Assembly that the proposed taxes would help address the ongoing rupee shortage. But we didn’t get to discuss how, and by how much, the taxes would reduce imports from India, or enhance overall exports.
I’m all for raising taxes. But only if the government can justify, with numbers, why the taxes need to be raised and how the increased revenue will be spent. The government would also have to prove that the increased taxes would not overburden the people, directly or indirectly, and that they would not make doing business any more difficult.
In this case – if taxes are being raised to address the rupee shortage – I also wanted to know that the government would not spend the extra revenue generated. Spending that money would just add to the rupee problem, not solve it, as almost all of the government’s expenditure ultimately goes to finance imports of goods and services, mostly from India.
Green tax. All taxes must have a legal basis. The Income Tax Act authorizes the imposition of PIT, BIT and CIT. The Sales Tax, Customs and Excise Act authorizes sales tax, customs duty and excise. The Land Act legitimizes land tax. The Local Government Act authorizes the collection of land tax, building, cattle, grazing, entertainment, advertisement and other taxes. And so on…
The so-called “green tax” is a new tax. As such, the Parliament should have first discussed the need for this tax, and then amended the relevant laws to permit the government to impose this new tax. Then, and only then, either as part of an amended law or as part of the Tax Revision Bill, should the government have proposed to levy the tax.
But I had several other questions on the Green Tax. One, why levy a green tax if the real objective is to reduce the rupee deficit? The purpose of a green tax should be to protect the environment, not to reduce the rupee deficit, and the proceeds from tax should go to programs that solve environmental problems.
But, two, do we have major environmental problems, and, more importantly, would the proposed green tax result in positive and meaningful contributions to the environment?
Three, wouldn’t taxing kerosene increase the cost of living for our poor? They are the ones who are the most dependent on kerosene for cooking and lighting. And wouldn’t taxing fuel increase the cost of transport, and therefore, the cost of goods? Would the general population be able to afford the resulting increase in the price of goods and services?
And four, do we really want to tax refrigerators and air conditioners? Would the taxes result in a decrease in the number of refrigerators, and if so, would that make a meaningful contribution to the environment? On the other hand, shouldn’t we be encouraging our people to enjoy the immediate health benefits and the conveniences of refrigerators?
Excise on alcohol. Alcohol is a real and growing menace in Bhutan. We need to act now, before we lose more people, especially our youth, to this scourge. But taxes alone will not prevent our people from drinking excessively. We need a holistic strategy, which includes taxes, but only as a part of bigger, more comprehensive action plan.
If the government must tax alcohol, tax those products that are the most dangerous. Last year’s tax increase avoided them; ditto this year.
Meat, fish and eggs. Taxing these items will, supposedly, lead to lower consumption, which, in turn, will lead to lower imports. Good. But what about domestic production? Wouldn’t the increased taxes also hinder domestic production of meat, fish and eggs?
Furniture. Tax imported furniture. But please, please, don’t make domestic production any more difficult than it already is.
Silk fabric. I have no idea how imposing a 10% sales tax and 50% customs duty on silk fabric will improve the rupee situation. But if it does, I’m for it. Otherwise, we need to rethink our strategy.
Power chainsaw. What’s the big idea of slapping a 20% sales tax and 30% customs on power chainsaws? If it is the environment, strengthen and enforce existing regulations. But, please, let’s not arbitrarily increase the price of labour saving devices.
The rupee crisis. The government must apply fiscal policy to address on-going and growing rupee shortage. One way is to increase taxes. But I’m not convinced that the proposed taxes would have had a meaningful effect, especially if the government were to spend the increased revenue from the increased taxes.
A better and more effective way to control the rupee crisis would be to reign in government expenditure. But that’s not what’s been happening. The government’s current expenditure for 2010-11 was Nu 17, 735 million. It jumped to Nu 17, 185 million in 2011-12. And just last week, the Assembly approved a current budget of Nu 18,262 million for 2012-13.
“As the Honourable Members are aware, our balance of payments with India has been worsening and the RMA has been facing a severe scarcity of Indian Rupees…” That was the finance minister’s opening line when he introduced the Tax Revision Bill in the National Assembly earlier today.
Yes, our balance of payments with India is in bad shape. And we are facing a severe shortage of Indian currency. In other words, we face a rupee crisis.
We have a crisis in our hands. And it’s no point playing the blame game. We must work together – we must think and act as one – to overcome the current crisis. And we must seize every economic opportunity, old and new, so that we emerge stronger from these difficult times.
Still, we must know who got us into this mess. And we must hold that person to account. That’s if we are serious about good governance. That’s if we are serious about getting out of this mess. Otherwise, with the same person in charge, the situation will just get worse.
So yesterday, during the National Assembly’s Question Hour, I asked the finance minister to tell us who should take responsibility for the rupee crisis. My question was straightforward:
The rupee crisis has caused a great deal of hardship to the people of Bhutan. More importantly, the crisis could compromise the economic sovereignty and security of our country. Will the Hon’ble Minister please explain who will take responsibility for the rupee crisis?
My question was straightforward. But the reply, which offered a detailed account of the causes and solutions of the rupee problem, was long and cumbersome. And the reply did not point out who, specifically, should be held accountable. Instead, the finance minister indicated that the Bhutanese people were both responsible and accountable for the current situation.
So let’s take a poll. Let’s see who we think should assume responsibility for the rupee crisis. Should it be the prime minister? Or should it be the finance minister? Or the RMA governor? Or should it be the people at large who should take responsibility for the economic mess?
The central secretariat complex outside the Tashichhodzong wore a deserted look on pedestrian day, this afternoon. No doubt, our civil servants were busy in their own offices, working, since they wouldn’t be able to attend the otherwise unending number of meetings that plague our government.
Norzin Lam, Thimphu’s main street, also wore a deserted look this afternoon. I saw students walking home and taxis zipping around, but I saw little else. Shops were empty. And some, like these shops on upper Norzin Lam, were closed for business.
There are many things wrong with pedestrian day. And one of the most damaging is its effect on businesses. Restaurants, grocery shops, hardware stores, commercial offices, even the small pann shops, are reeling under the effects of Pedestrian day. That’s why, during question hour this morning, I’d wanted to ask the minister for economic affairs this question:
Will the Hon’ble Minister please report on the amount of business that has been lost in Thimphu because of the implementation of “Pedestrian Day”? Furthermore, will the Hon’ble Minister kindly explain the Royal Government’s measures to facilitate business on “Pedestrian Day”?
However, my question was not included for discussion in today’s question hour. Perhaps the minister for economic affairs was of the opinion that my question was not relevant. And, perhaps, he convinced the Hon’ble Speaker to reject my question. But the question remains: is pedestrian day affecting businesses?
The government cannot continue to ignore this question. The question is relevant. And it is important. But it’s not just Thimphu businesses which are suffering – businesses in other dzongkhags, especially those in the South, are also reeling from the impact of pedestrian day.
Does anyone know why the government insists on permitting only FCB to import vegetables? I don’t. The prime minister had explained that only FCB would be provided Indian rupees to import vegetables as FCB would be able to buy in bulk and would not be motivated by profit, which would make prices come down.
But vegetable prices have not come down. Instead, they’ve skyrocketed, because FCB’s prices turned out to be much higher. Plus, a lot of their vegetables had turned bad even before they reached Thimphu. As a result, consumers paid higher prices, but received poorer quality, and vegetable suppliers suffered big losses. In addition, the government now has to bear the cost of 65MT of vegetables that were rejected by the vegetable suppliers.
FCB’s first attempt at importing vegetables has failed terribly. So you’d think that the government w0uld learn from the experience and finally accept that importing vegetables from Falakata is not as easy as it seems. You’d think that they would revert to letting the vegetable suppliers do what they do best, i.e., import vegetables, a specialized trade that they’ve mastered over decades of doing the business.
But what does the government do? They dig in their heels and redouble their efforts to force FCB to import vegetables in spite of the fact that they obviously do not know how. So FCB has reportedly hired an Indian vegetable supplier to “help” them. And the government has forced our vegetable suppliers to pay as much as 70% of their orders upfront, in advance. The idea, it seems, is to coerce vegetable suppliers to buy from FCB, regardless of the quality and the price of the vegetables.
Doing business in Bhutan is difficult as it is. But the government seems hell-bent on making it even more difficult. They should know that businesses, even if they are small time vegetable suppliers, do not stand to lose much; they’ll simply move on. The real losers, the government should know, are the consumers, the people of Bhutan.
Yesterday’s economic forum was scripted and implemented to perfection.
If all this sound too good to be true, it probably is.
Consider this: Just 6 months ago, in December last year, the RMA’s rupee borrowings had peaked at Rs 11 billion, and the government had sold US$ 200 million for Rs 10.3 billion to clear Rs 8 billion. So at that time we were left with Rs 3 billion in credit, and Rs 2.3 billion in cash.
Today, the RMA’s rupee borrowings have reportedly already hit Rs 15 billion. And we have already spent the Rs 2.3 billion we had in cash. So that means that in the last six months we have accumulated a rupee deficit of 14.3 billion (Rs 15 billion – Rs 3 billion + Rs 2.3 billion = Rs 14.3 billion).
We owe Rs 15 billion. And we have US$ 720 million in reserves. US$ 720 million equals more than Rs 41 billion at today’s exchange rates. That’s an excess of Rs 26 billion. And that’s why the international experts have us convinced that the rupee crunch is a foreign currency reserve management issue; not an economic crisis.
Now consider this: we accumulated a rupee deficit of 14.3 billion in less than 6 months. If we use our foreign currency reserves to clear this debt, we’ll be left with the equivalent of Rs 26 billion in foreign currency reserves. But at this rate, we will have run up a deficit in excess of Rs 26 billion in less than one year. And we can again use our foreign currency reserves to clear this deficit too.
But then we’ll be left with nothing in our foreign currency reserves. Forget about the Constitutional requirement of maintaining foreign currency reserves not less than one year’s essential imports – our foreign currency reserves will have dropped all the way to zero; it will have been completely depleted. In other words, if, as the experts suggest, we “manage” our foreign currency reserves, we will have spent our entire reserves in less than a year, and we’ll be forced to accept, belatedly, that we are dealing with a major economic crisis.
So don’t blame the mismanagement of our foreign currency reserves for the ongoing rupee crunch. And, please, don’t think of misusing our reserves.
Instead, look at where the real problem lies. Look, for example, at government expenditure. And ask our experts if an increase in government expenditure from 21 billion per year (in 2008-09) to 38 billion per year (budgeted for 2011-12) could have caused the rupee crunch; ask them if excessive and uncontrolled government expenditure is what could have caused the economic crisis.
Doing business in Bhutan is already difficult. But it’s getting even more difficult.
Each year, the World Bank publishes a “Doing Business” report in which they rank countries according to the “ease of doing business” in those countries. Here’s how our country has fared in their report over the last few years.
In 2008, Bhutan was ranked 119 out of the 178 countries that the project studied.
In 2009, we fell to 124 out of 181 countries.
In 2010, we were placed at 126 out of 186 countries.
In 2011, we plummeted to 146 out of 183 countries
And in 2012, we improved slightly to 142 out of the 183 countries that were studied.
Our overall ease of doing business ranking fell from 119 to 142 during the period 2008 to 2012. Not good.
But it will get worse. Bhutan’s ranking is probably set to fall again.
Why? Because it’s getting harder to do business in Bhutan.
Why? Because the series of policy measures introduced by the government in light of the rupee crunch all make it much more difficult to do business in Bhutan.
Banks, for instance, cannot lend money. That means that businesses now do not have access to credit.
Informal trade across our borders have come to a standstill. And that has affected hundreds of small time business across the length and breadth of our country.
Import of a range of goods have been suddenly banned. That threatens the investments of a range of businesses.
And most recently, vegetable vendors will no longer be allowed to import vegetables; only FCB will. That means that dozens of vegetable vendors will soon lose their jobs to a government-owned company.
So Bhutan’s ranking in the next Doing Business report will probably take a beating.
Obviously, the ranking, in and by itself, doesn’t matter. What does matter is that it really could be getting really more difficult to do business in Bhutan. And doing business – good business, and lots of it – is what we desperately need to overcome the current rupee crunch.
What also matters is that potential investors refer to the Doing Business reports. And investment – foreign and domestic – is what we desperately need to strengthen our economy, and ensure that we do not face another rupee crunch in the future.
In my previous post I had proposed that, “the government is getting ready to sell even more foreign currency from our reserves.”
What if I am correct? What if the government is, indeed, preparing to sell foreign currency to alleviate the rupee crunch? If so, what is the procedure?
Last year, four months ago, the government sold US$ 200 million of our foreign currency reserves. At that time, US$ 200 million worked out to Nu 10.3 billion, which in turn worked out to 14% of our GDP. That was, and is, a lot of money. But no one questioned the process. All that was reported on the process was: “The government on Thursday night struck a deal to sell USD 200M to address the country’s dire Indian rupee (INR) position…”
We will be required to dip into our foreign currency reserves occasionally. So we should think about the process. Who, by law, for example, can approve the use of our foreign currency reserves?
According to Article 14 Section 3 of the Constitution, “Public money shall not be drawn from the Consolidated Fund except through appropriation in accordance with the law.” In other words, the government cannot spend money unless that expenditure has been approved by the parliament.
But the Constitution is silent about the procedure for spending money from the foreign currency reserves. Instead, Section 115 of the Royal Monetary Act says that, “The Authority may purchase, sell or deal in– foreign exchange …”
Does ‘foreign exchange’ here include foreign exchange from our reserves? If so, should RMA have the complete authority to sell our foreign exchange? If not, what should be the procedure?
The government’s annual budget is debated and approved in the National Assembly. It is then submitted to the National Council for review. After that, it is submitted to His Majesty the King for Royal Assent.
The government’s budget for 2011-12 is about Nu 38 billion. That is not even four times the amount of foreign currency reserves that was sold last year (US$ 200 million fetched Rs 10.3 billion). The process to approve the government’s budget is vigorous. And rightfully so. But the process to approve use of our foreign currency reserves seems to be nonexistent. At best it is vague.
It is essential that the government and the parliament consider this matter urgently. Otherwise, we could end up recklessly depleting our foreign currency reserves.